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Introduction 
On 28 May 1979, Greece - against all odds and five years ahead of Spain and Portugal 
- signed the Treaty of Accession to the EEC in Athens. It was a culmination of an 
effort that had commenced in the late 1950s when Greece had become the first 
country to be granted association status on 9 July 1961.1 In 1975, the then Prime 
0LQLVWHU .RQVWDQWLQRV .DUDPDQOLV ZKR RYHUVDZ *UHHFH¶V WUDQVLWLRQ WR GHPRFUDF\
applied for EEC membership as a long-ODVWLQJ PHDVXUH WR SURWHFW WKH FRXQWU\¶V
nascent democratic institutions, secure its social cohesion and economic 
modernization, and ultimately guarantee enduring integration in the West. Greece had 
experienced a dictatorship since 1967, a period that abruptly ended in 1974 with a 
Greek-VSRQVRUHG FRXSG¶pWDW DJDLQVW WKH3UHVLGHQWRI&\SUXV $UFKELVKRS0DNDULRV
and the subsequent Turkish invasion of Cyprus. This was neither the first nor the last 
time since the inception of the Greek state that the political and intellectual elites 
turned to Europe. 2  Greece had a tradition of participation in numerous alliances 
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throughout its modern history because of its small size, economic backwardness, and 
unstable geopolitical neighborhood. Such alliances had enabled Greece to strengthen 
its national security and advance its economic development. Often, however, such a 
reliance RQH[WHUQDODOOLHVVXEMHFWHG*UHHFH¶VGRPHVWLFSROLWLFVDQGSROLFLHVWRIRUHLJQ
influence and in lack of Greek ownership allowed several political elites and their 
followers to view these alliances, including EEC membership, either as a panacea that 
would FXUHDOO WKHFRXQWU\¶VSUREOHPVRUDVDSODJXHWREHEODPHGIRU WKHFRXQWU\¶V
ills.3 
 
Not surprisingly therefore, the second enlargement, namely, the accession first of 
Greece and then of Spain and Portugal, has been revisited by historians and political 
scientists alike recently, especially following the opening of the state/Community 
archives of the 1970s and early 1980s. 4  The bulk of the historical work on the 
enlargement of the Community, however, has a rather introspective character. 5 
Research on Greece and the EEC, albeit limited, tends to adopt a national approach, 
examining the contributing role of domestic economic, political and social factors.6 
Such an approach highlights the interaction between domestic forces and the 
development of the applicant¶V(XURSHDQSROLF\1RQHWKHOHVV LW IDLOV WRFDSWXUH WKH
transformative impact of enlargement on the EEC itself, the importance of the effects 
of negotiations on its institutional structures and its political cohesion, and finally, on 
the way the Community as an organization debates and responds to the pressures and 
demands of applicants.7 
 
This chapter, in adopting a multi-level and multi-archival analysis, will focus on 
Greece, which was the first out of the three Southern European countries to dive into 
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the fray of enlargement, and secondly will concentrate on the internal deliberations 
amongst the nine EC-PHPEHU VWDWHV LQ WKH FULWLFDO SHULRG EHWZHHQ $WKHQV¶ IRUPDO
DSSOLFDWLRQ LQ-XQHDQG WKH&RPPXQLW\¶VGHFLVLRQ WRRSHQXSHQWU\ WDONVZLWK
Greece in February 1976. Although the period under examination precedes the formal 
negotiations between Greece and the EEC that commenced at the end of 1976, it is 
H[WUHPHO\ WHOOLQJ RI WKH 1LQH¶V WKLQNLQJ LQ WKHLU SROLWLFDO GHFLVLRQ WR VD\ µ\HV¶ WR
Greece and of thH &RPPXQLW\¶V XOWLPDWH PRWLYDWLRQ WR H[SDQG VRXWKZDUGV LQ WKH
1970s.  
 
7KH*UHHNHQWU\WRWKH((&FRQVWLWXWHGDODQGPDUNLQWKH&RPPXQLW\¶VHQODUJHPHQW
history and its evolution for two reasons. It constituted a genuine challenge to the 
Nine who had to deal with the changing nature of applicants - from long established 
democratic and market economies to recently democratised and economically less 
developed states. Secondly and linked to these countries domestic volatile situation 
and the evolving international system of détente, it was a round of accession where 
WKHLPSRUWDQFHRI&ROG:DUFDOFXODWLRQVIRUWKHVWDELOLW\RI(XURSH¶VVRXWKHUQIODQN
were pronounced.8 
 
*UHHFH¶VQDVFHQWGHPRFUDF\LVNQRFNLQJRQ((&¶VGRRU 
As soon as the dictatorship fell, the EEC was seen as the only appropriate forum 
ZKHUH*UHHFHFRXOGUHVWRUHLWVFRQILGHQFHDQGVXSSRUWWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQ
process. The freezing of the Athens Association Agreement of 1961 after the coup, 
coupled with the forced withdrawal from the Council of Europe in 1969, had 
contributed to the symbolic association of Europe with democracy in Greek eyes. In 
marked contrast to the perceived American stance of indifference and even tolerance 
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WRZDUGV WKH &RORQHOV¶ UXOH WKH ((&¶V XVH RI SROLWLFDO DQG HFRQomic sanctions had 
helped undermine the legitimacy of the military dictatorship. 9  Whilst Washington 
remained essential to Greek national security10ZLWKLQ.DUDPDQOLV¶ VPDOOFLUFOHRQH
clear conclusion was drawn. Greece needed to reduce over-dependence on the USA 
and achieve multilateral diplomacy without questioning the vital premises of the post-
1945 Greek foreign policy of belonging to the West. The newly pursued 
multilateralism included policies unthinkable to pre-1974 conservatives. Karamanlis 
took personal interest in expanding the web of political but mainly economic relations 
with the Balkan states.11 However such policies, despite their symbolic importance, 
produced limited practical results. Conversely, EEC membership seemed to offer a 
viable solution to the Greek domestic predicament and accelerated progress towards 
PHPEHUVKLSEHFDPHD WRSSULRULW\RQ WKH JRYHUQPHQW¶V DJHQGD(XURSHRIIHUHG WKH
Greeks an alternative model for democratic growth untarnished by the real and 
alleged sins of the United States.12 
 
The surprising arrival of the Greek application for membership, however, rocked the 
EEC boat with a series of economic, institutional and political problems. The Athens 
government could have hardly chosen a worse moment to apply. The 1973 oil shock 
that plunged the industrialized West in recession put the Community model under 
duress. Indeed, several Community policies had suffered substantive setbacks that 
made the member states unease at the prospect of a fresh widening, only two years 
since the previous enlargement and whilst Britain was renegotiating its own 
membership.13 The situation was made all the more critical by the presence of a 
geopolitical dimension that had been absent during the first enlargement. Security 
came to the fore suddenly, whHQ*UHHFHGHFLGHGWRZLWKGUDZIURP1$72¶VPLOLWDU\
 6 
command on 14 August 1974 in the wake of the second Turkish invasion of Cyprus. 
The simultaneous fall of the other two southern European dictatorships of Portugal 
and Spain coupled with the political and financial turmoil that beset Italy during the 
same period, exacerbated fears of potential destabilization of the Western position 
WKURXJKRXW 6RXWKHUQ (XURSH :RUULHV DERXW WKH :HVWHUQ V\VWHP¶V EDODQFH ZHUH
compounded by the prospect of accepting Greece, whose relations with its largest 
QHLJKERU DQG WKH VWUDWHJLFDOO\ SLYRWDO VWDWH DORQJ 1$72¶V VRXWKHUQ IODQN 7XUNH\
could only be described as hostile. Admitting Greece would inevitably entail the risk 
of getting the Community entangled in the Greek-Turkish dispute and, as a result, 
disturb the equal distance the Community sought to maintain between the two 
countries ± bearing in mind that Turkey was not only a key NATO member but also 
an associate EEC member.  
 
Alongside the geopolitical concerns, the economic dimension was setting off alarm 
EHOOV LQ %UXVVHOV *UHHFH¶V GHSUHVVHG HFRQRP\ DQG LQHIILFLHQW FLYLO DGPLQLVWUDWLRQ
ZRXOGIXUWKHUWHVW WKH&RPPXQLW\¶VLQVWLWXWLRQV,I WKH*UHHNVWDWHZHUHWRHQWHU WKH
EEC, it would have to undergo substantial structural changes for which the 
Community would most probably bear the financial brunt in the form of transfers of 
resources. Crucially, Greece was never examined on its own merits but rather seen as 
a forerunner of the other two emerging Southern European democracieV D µ<HV¶ WR
*UHHFHZRXOGPDNHLWPXFKKDUGHUWRVD\µ1R¶WR6SDLQDQG3RUWXJDO7KHSURVSHFWRI
a Mediterranean enlargement in turn, would provide unwelcome competition and 
further strain the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP). Ultimately, it would oblige the 
Community to proceed to a full-scale reform of the CAP in order to ease Italian and 
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French concerns about Greek and much more importantly, Spanish competition in 
Mediterranean agricultural produce.  
 
Arguments on both the Community and the Greek side were familiar to the 
Commission. It shared the need not to snub the Greeks in their precarious political 
climate of transition but as a guardian of the Treaties felt it bore the responsibility to 
point out the challenges that possible entry would pose on the institutional and 
political development of the EEC. Moreover, the Commission assumed that Greece, 
DVRQHRILWVRIILFLDOSXWLWµKDGEHHQIHGDUDWKHUKHDY\GLHWRISRVLWLYHFRPPHQWDU\
about Greek membership from the very highest levels of governments in member 
VWDWHV¶DQGWKXVIDLOHGWRUHFRJQL]HWKHQHHGVIRUDSUHSDUDWRU\SHULRGRIHFRQRPLFDLG
that would enable it to overcome its structural weaknesses and adapt more easily to 
WKH &RPPXQLW\¶V PHFKDQLVP DQG SROLFLHV 14  7KH &RPPLVVLRQ¶V 2SLQLRQ ILQDOO\
submitted to the Council of Ministers on 28 January 1976, was considered to be a 
lukewarm statement which on one hand recognised fully the democratic obligation in 
DFFHSWLQJ *UHHFH¶V ELG IRU PHPEHUVKLS EXW RQ WKH RWKHU FRQVLGHUHG WKH XSFRPLQJ
enlargement as an opportune time to deepen the process of European integration. The 
suggestion for an affirmative reply to Greece but with a 10-year pre-accession period 
would address these conflicting anxieties. 15  In an unprecedented act in the 
HQODUJHPHQW¶V KLVWRU\ DQG IROORZLQJ $WKHQV¶ VWURQJ UHDFWLRQ DQG KHDY\ KDQGHG
lobbying of the Nine, the Council defied the Commission by unanimously rejecting its 
Opinion merely two weeks after its submission. There was no dispute that the Greek 
application involved an economically and politically fragile country whose possible 
inclusion in the Community could bring closer to home the Greco-Turkish dispute at a 
time of perceived Euro sclerosis. 16  However, such anxieties gave way to the 
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overwhelming imperative of finding a new international role for the EEC by aiding 
the nascent Greek democracy with the ultimate aim of stabilizing the country within 
western institutions and thus preventing a possible knock on effect on neighboring 
Spain, Portugal and Italy in the precarious geopolitical climate of Southern Europe. 
 
How did enlargement become a foreign policy tool? 
The collapse of right-wing authoritarianism in Greece, Spain and Portugal was an 
undisputed conclusion by 1975, and the question was how both sides of the Atlantic 
were willing to deal with it. 17 The unanticipated toppling of the Portuguese 
dictatorship on 25 April 1974 that sunk the country into political turmoil caught the 
West off guard.18 The new military-dominated regime in Portugal was undecided as to 
the direction in which to take the country and whether or not to hand over power to a 
democratically elected government. There were concerns that the country might slide 
towards a kind of Euro-&RPPXQLVP DQG XQGHUPLQH 3RUWXJDO¶V PHPEHUVKLS RI
NATO. Such concerns were strongly voiced in Washington. For Kissinger, it was 
HVVHQWLDOWRLVRODWH3RUWXJDODVWKHFRXQWU\KDGEHHQDOOHJHGO\µORVW¶WR&RPPXQLVP19 
(XURSHDQV ZHUH HTXDOO\ WURXEOHG DERXW 3RUWXJDO¶V XQFHUWDLQ IXWXUH ZLWK +DUROG
Wilson, the then British Prime Minister declaring 3RUWXJDO D µWHVW RI GpWHQWH¶ 20 
However, the Nine progressively adopted a more confident view, putting emphasis on 
strengthening the hand of the democratic forces in Portugal, which had a foothold in 
the new government in the form of Mario Soares, a democratic socialist who had long 
lived in exile and who was Foreign Minister.21 
 
Only four months after the Carnation revolution, the Greek dictatorship instigated a 
coup against Makarios that ultimately led to the Turkish invasion of Cyprus. The 
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Cyprus issue per se was not as essential to the strategy and contingency military 
planning of the United States and NATO. The American interest in Cyprus was 
essentially a preventive one: to keep its political problems from boiling over and 
throwing wrenches into the Greco-Turkish relationship. 22  As a State department 
EULHILQJSDSHURIHDUO\$XJXVWGHFODUHGWKDWµWKH86GRHVQRWKDYHIXQGDPHQWDO
interests in Cyprus itself but we do have a major interest in the effect of the Cyprus 
problem on fundamental US interests in Greece, Turkey and the Eastern 
0HGLWHUUDQHDQ¶ &RQVHTXHQWO\ WKH SDSHU FRQFOXGHG WKDW µRXU VWUDWHJ\ LV GLUHFWHG
WRZDUG UHPRYLQJ &\SUXV DV D ERQH RI FRQWHQWLRQ EHWZHHQ *UHHFH DQG 7XUNH\¶23 
Kissinger was eager to cooperate with the British on the Cyprus front especially since 
$PHULFD¶V ODWLWXGH KDG EHHQ UHVWULFWHG E\ WKH VWURQJ DQG LQIOXHQWLDO SUHVHQFH RI WKH
Greek lobby in Congress. Moreover Britain, as signatory to the 1960 Treaty of 
Guarantee of the Cypriot state was thrust into a position of responsibility. However, 
the British lacked the power to take effective action as they suffered from what James 
&DOODJKDQ WKH)RUHLJQ 6HFUHWDU\GHVFULEHGDV µUHVSRQVLELOLW\ZLWKRXWSRZHU¶6LQFH
VXFFHVVLYH%ULWLVKJRYHUQPHQWVKDGDGRSWHGDSROLF\RIµLPSDUWLDOLty and non- 
LQYROYHPHQW¶ ZLWK WKHLUSULRULW\ UHPDLQLQJ WKH UHWHQWLRQ DQG VDIHW\ RI WKHLU PLOLWDU\
facilities on the island while giving the Americans the first say. The main nexus of 
such policy was that no unilateral military action could be taken without American 
co-operation.24 In fact, in 1975, London had wished for a complete British military 
withdrawal from Cyprus but fretted the negative impact of such an act on its special 
UHODWLRQVKLSZLWKWKH86$µJLYHQWKHJOREDO LPSRUWDQFHRIZRUNLQJFORVHO\ZLWK the 
$PHULFDQV¶25 It was not only Britain though that was at dismay. Generally speaking, 
it is true that the handling of the Cyprus crisis was not a success for any of the actors 
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involved. The Economist GHFODUHGWKDWµWKH7XUNVKDYHKDGWKHLUZD\LQ&\SUXV. For 
HYHU\RQHHOVHFRQFHUQHGWKHUHLVRQO\IDLOXUHWRUHSRUW¶26 
 
The newly installed government in Athens, confronted with a rapidly growing popular 
anti-Americanism and the humiliating consequences of the recent double Turkish 
invasion in Cyprus, was under pressure to act.27 The Prime Minister, Konstantinos 
Karamanlis concluded that war against Turkey would be a highly dangerous option, 
as the seven years of the junta KDGOHIWWKHFRXQWU\¶VGHIHQVHVLQDSUHFDULRXVVWDWH,Q
a private meeting of political leaders, it was concluded that the Greek armed forces 
µZHUH XQSUHSDUHG LQDGHTXDWHO\ HTXLSSHG DQG LQ QR SRVLWLRQ WR GHFODUH ZDU RQ
7XUNH\¶ 28  ,QVWHDG RI ZDU .DUDPDQOLV DQQRXQFHG WKH FRXQWU\¶V ZLWKGUDZDO IURP
1$72¶V LQWHJUDWHG PLOLWDU\ VWUXFWXUH DQG UHTXHVWed the US to enter into 
renegotiations on the future of US bases on Greek soil.29 
 
7KHWKUHDWWR1$72¶VVRXWKHUQIODQNLQWKHDIWHUPDWKRI*UHHFH¶VZLWKGUDZDOIURPLWV
PLOLWDU\ FRPPDQG DQG WKH FRXQWU\¶V XQVWDEOH GRPHVWLF SROLWLFDO VLWXDWLRQ GXULQJ
transition to democracy loomed large. Although Karamanlis was firmly attached to 
the West and his government had made it clear that the withdrawal from NATO was 
the least damaging course that had been open to it and the only acceptable policy to 
the public at the tLPH IHDUV RYHU *UHHFH¶V IXWXUH SROLF\ RULHQWDWLRQ UHPDLQHG DQG
abetted by the rise of the left in domestic politics. The newly formed Panhellenic 
Socialist Movement (PASOK) under Andreas Papandreou, despite coming third in the 
1974 legislative elections, was becoming a progressively popular party campaigning 
on an anti-American and anti-EEC platform. An illustration of this line of thinking 
ZDV HYLGHQW GXULQJ &KDQFHOORU 6FKPLGW¶V YLVLW WR $WKHQV LQ 0D\  .DUDPDQOLV
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went on to explain to the Chancellor that, although his parliamentary control was 
FRPSOHWHDQGWKHFRXQWU\¶V1$72ZLWKGUDZDOKDGUHDFKHGLWVOLPLWVLQSROLWLFDOJDLQ
it would be a mistake to assume that he could or would pursue policies which were 
unacceptable to either to his opponents or Greek public opinion.30 The Nine knew that 
failure to grant Karamanlis a success on the EEC application front would undermine 
KLVSRVLWLRQMHRSDUGL]HWKHFRXQWU\¶VVPRRWKGHPRFUDWL]DWLRQSURFHVVDQGLQWXUQLWV
foreign policy direction.31 
 
All of these fears over Greece were exacerbated by its potential spillover effect on the 
neighboring countries in the Southern European region. Indeed, in the mid-1970s the 
Western system in southern Europe seemed increasingly under threat.32 Besides the 
Greco-Turkish conflLFWWKH&\SUXVLVVXHDQGWKH3RUWXJXHVHTXHVWLRQ6SDLQ)UDQFR¶V
dictatorship seemed to be nearing the end in 1975 with the 1953 base agreement with 
WKH 86$ LQ WKH DLU:HVWHUQ OHDGHUV ZHUH HTXDOO\ FRQFHUQHG DERXW ,WDO\¶V GRPHVWLF
instability, and economic crisis. Anxiety heightened even more with compromesso 
storico, and the probability of the Italian Communist Party coming to power. All of 
these helped exacerbate the already dismal strategic outlook in the Mediterranean 
region. In contrast to the first postwar decades when the American fleet dominated the 
Mediterranean, the 1970s witnessed a growing Soviet infiltration of the southern coast 
states.33 In the face of deep economic malaise, Britain had already undertaken the 
defence review that had led to a phasing out of its Mediterranean defence.34 The 
$PHULFDQVH[SUHVVHGWKHLUIHDUVDERXW%ULWLVKZLWKGUDZDOZDUQLQJWKDWµWKHLPSDFWRQ
WKH 6RXWKHUQ UHJLRQ ZRXOG EH YHU\ VHULRXV «DQG WKH UHGXFWLRQV LQ 8. DLU IRUFHV
VWDWLRQHG LQ 0DOWD DQG &\SUXV ZRXOG EH JUDYH¶.35 These fast paced developments 
played out against the transformative environment of superpower détente.36 Despite 
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its conservative character of stabilizing the status quo, détente between the two 
superpowers had unintended consequences in the volatile environment of Southern 
Europe where the relaxation of the once constraining framework of the Cold War 
further fostered domestic instability.37 5RPDQRDQG5RPHURULJKWO\SRLQWRXWWKDW³D
far more complex and lasting pattern of intra-European détente has thus emerged. 
Focus and emphasis have shifted from the conservative intent of détente policies 
pursued by the two superpowers with the aim of consolidating bipolarity, to the 
WUDQVIRUPDWLYH DQG GHVWDELOL]LQJ HIIHFWV XQOHDVKHG DFURVV WKH ,URQ FXUWDLQ¶38 In the 
PLQGV RI WKH SROLWLFDO HOLWHV RQ ERWK VLGHV RI WKH $WODQWLF WKHUHIRUH *UHHFH¶V
geopolitical and internal unstable order became part and parcel of this changing 
setting of crisis in Southern Europe.39 
 
The United States felt it was in decline to act on its own. The tide of anti-
Americanism with its ebbs and flows had swept Southern Europe with limited room 
for maneuver. To make matters worse, the trauma of Vietnam and Watergate had 
paralyzed the presidency with Congress becoming more assertive. The Ford 
administration no longer enjoyed the same flexibility in foreign affairs, a development 
that would add an unexpected layer of complexity in the conduct of US foreign 
policy40. The Turkish embargo and the halting of aid to Vietnam represented the 
victory of Congress over a weak president.41 Especially, the US embargo on arms for 
7XUNH\ZDVDQLOOXVWUDWLRQRIKRZWKH86µFRXOGEHSDUDO\]HGWRWKHGLVDGYDQWDJHRI
1$72¶ 42  German Foreign Minister Hans-Dietrich Genscher talking with Italian 
Prime Minister Aldo Moro aboXW 7XUNH\ µIRXQG LW JURWHVTXH WKDW DIWHU 1$72 KDV
guaranteed our security for over 25 years, we find ourselves in internal disarray due to 
RXULQDELOLW\WRKDQGOHRXURZQSUREOHPV¶43 
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In an effort to overcome such constraints, the Americans looked -not immediately in 
the case of Portugal but quite forcefully over Greece- to their Europeans allies for 
help. A paper on the transatlantic cooperation, highlightened the importance they 
SODFHGRQWKH((&¶VUHJLRQDOVWDELOLW\UROHµ'XULQJWKHSDVW\HDUWKH(&- nine have 
JUDGXDOO\ UHILQHG D FRPPRQ DSSURDFK WR SUREOHPV LQ WKH 0HGLWHUUDQHDQ¶V QRUWKHUQ
ties, based on a desire to promote stability and political moderation and using the joint 
instruments of trade concessions, financial assistance, and ultimate closer association 
ZLWKRUZLWKRXWPHPEHUVKLSLQ(XURSH7KH1LQH¶VDSSURDFKUHIOHFWVDJURZLQJVHQVH
of responsibility, based on self- interests. There is a major US interest involved in 
accepting and encouraging the sharing of the Mediterranean burden with the NLQH¶44 
 
Echoing a similar sentiment on the other side of the Atlantic, the Germans understood 
.DUDPDQOLV¶SUHGLFDPHQWDQGQRWHGWKDWµDOWKRXJKKLVRZQSRVLWLRQRQ1$72DQGRQ
the US presence in Greece was well known, we should not expect him to alienate 
public support at this stage by pro-American gestures or by a conspicuous return to 
1$72¶45 The Germans, like the rest of the Nine, came to support *UHHFH¶VZLVKWR
MRLQ WKH &RPPXQLW\ NQRZLQJ YHU\ ZHOO WKDW WKH &RPPXQLW\¶V XQHTXLYRFDO VXSSRUW
would find approval with Greek public opinion and buttress the new social order, if 
only because the Greek government had oversold membership as being key to 
protecting democracy. Similarly, Paris FRQFOXGHG WKDW µZH PXVW FRQFHUQ RXUVHOYHV
with not leaving this country on its own before the appeals of neutralism or the Soviet 
Bloc. There is therefore a certain urgency to consolidate a government born in 
DGYHUVLW\ DQG ZLWK QHZ VHWEDFNV WKUHDWHQLQJ LWV H[LVWHQFH 7KH WRROV DW WKH 1LQH¶V
disposal to help Greece are political DQGHFRQRPLF¶.46 The British shared the need for 
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WKH((&WRRIIHUWKHVROXWLRQDVE\WKHLURZQDGPLVVLRQµ:HDUHWRRSRRUWRGRPXFK
RXUVHOYHV /RJLFDOO\ZH VKRXOG OHDYH LW WRRWKHUV WRPDNH WKH UXQQLQJ«:HVKRXOG
therefore be ready to encourage our allies to help. The Germans and the French are 
WKH NH\¶47 It was therefore within the EEC context that Britain chose to act and 
though this medium to consult with the Americans.48  The policy of enlargement, 
however, for the Europeans did not seek to reduce the role of the United States in 
Greece. 49  Europeans had the diplomatic and political means of influence that 
complemented those of the United States. 
 
(YHQ WKH )UHQFK GLG QRW GHVLUH WR DQWDJRQLVH RU XQGHUPLQH WKH 8QLWHG 6WDWHV¶
relationship to Greece. On the contUDU\ WKH )UHQFK WKRXJKW µIDU IURP HQFRXUDJLQJ
Greece to move even further away from the Atlantic alliance, the specific action of 
WKH 1LQH FRXOG UHGLUHFW WKLV FRXQWU\ DZD\ IURP VXFK GDQJHU¶50  The offer of full 
membership to the EEC would assist the Greek JRYHUQPHQW¶VGHPRFUDWLVDWLRQHIIRUW
and in turn keep the country aligned to the Western system, DV µ*UHHFH QHHGV QRZ
PRUH WKDQ DQ\WKLQJ WKH PRUDO VXSSRUW RI LWV :HVWHUQ IULHQGV¶51 As Max Van der 
Stoel, the Dutch Foreign Minister, underlined when commenting on the anti-
$PHULFDQLVP GRPLQDWLQJ *UHHFH µ7RGD\ *UHHFH IHHOV WKH QHHG WR HVWDEOLVK FORVHU
UHODWLRQVZLWK(XURSH%XWWKLVPXVWQRWLPSO\DQWDJRQLVPZLWKWKH8QLWHG6WDWHV¶52 
 
The overwhelming events forced the USA and EEC to confront the Greek and more 
generally the southern Europe problem in a coordinated manner. Utilizing new, more 
effective multilateral Euro-Atlantic fora-already in place in order to address the 
darkening economic outlook- Western powers co-operated in tackling the Greek 
crisis.53 During this intense consultation phase, the major members of the European 
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Community in agreement with the United States concluded that in order to ensure 
stabilization in Southern Europe they should anchor these countries firmly to the EEC 
either through closer association or full membership, even at the cost of the US losing 
direct political influence and its economic interests suffering.54 
 
Conclusions 
7KHTXHVWLRQRI6RXWKHUQ(XURSHDQGLQSDUWLFXODU*UHHFH¶V((&PHPEHUVKLSZDVWR
be framed primarily, in Cold War terms. The Community was at the same time 
defensive and assertive in facing up to the Greek challenge. It was wary of the 
possible diluting effects of a Greek and in turn a Southern European enlargement on 
the institutions and of the financial costs involved, but at the same time it was eager to 
UHVSRQG WR WKH DSSOLFDQWV¶ FDOO IRU WKH QHHG IRU VWDELOL]DWLRQ LQ WKH IRUP RI
democratization, social cohesion, and economic modernization. Accepting Greece 
was the only policy the Nine could successfully follow in order to mitigate and to 
dispel anti-:HVWHUQ IHHOLQJV LQ WKH FRXQWU\ DQG IDFLOLWDWH WKH *UHHN JRYHUQPHQW¶V
efforts to keep the country within the Western fold. Therefore, the Greek accession 
talks constituted a key episode in the course of which the Community discovered its 
SRZHU DV D VWDELOL]LQJ IDFWRU LQ D &ROG :DU FULVLV ,Q DFFHSWLQJ *UHHFH¶V ELG IRU
membership, the Nine set out on a path that would eventually lead to far-reaching 
changes in the whole nature of the Community and its role as an international actor.55 
By utilizing its newly found soft power ± centered on the promise of enlargement ± 
the European Community redefined itself as a civilian power and differentiated -- 
most of the times in a complementary way -- its role within the Atlantic world, 
offering a European solution to the European crisis of the South in the 1970s.56 
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